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Summary.

,.,

~~~

~~

1.

-

This petition

fAA-<

·

~.

presen~uestion

of

whether the Long shor emeri' s and Harbor Workers' Compen sa tion
Act, 33 U.S.C. § 901, imposes t he same max imum on pa yment s in
~

the case of death - payments to survivor s that it impo ses in th e

'-._...//"'

case of comp ensation - payments to victims.

~ ~/ea.~~~."-.A/~~'5'
~-

2J;J(VJ'J' 5t~ ~~~t:4~

Q__

~~51~~~~

-22. Facts.

GEO Control was a public contractor operating

-------.,

under the Defense Base Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1651, which incorporates

...

the Longshoremen's and Harbor Horker's Compensation Act, a
comprehensive scheme for benefiting an employee injured on
the job or his survivors if he is killed on the job, by
payments proportionate to his earnings.

William Rasmussen

was an employee of GEO Control working in Viet-Nam.

He was

killed by a land mine, and his widow and son are entitled to
some benefits.
The case revolves around the following provisions of the
Act:
33 U.S.C. (Supp. V) 906 (b)(l):

Com~ensation forJaisability' shall not exceed

the folfowing percentages oil:l:i'"e ·app ~cable
national average weekly wage as determined by
the Secretary under paragraph (3):
(A) 125 per centum or $167, whichever is greater,
during the period ending September 30, 1973.
(B) 150 per centum during the period beginning
October 1, 1973, and ending September 30, 1975.
(C) 175 per centt~ during the period beginning
October 1, 1974, and ending September 30, 1975.
(D) 200 per centum beggining October 1, 1975.
(b) (3):

As soon as practicable after June 30 of each year,
and in any event prior to October 1 of such year,
the Secretary shall determine the national average
weekly wage for the three consecutive calendar quarters
ending June 30.
(d):

Determinations under . this subsection with respect to
a period shall apply to employees or survivors currently
receiving compensation for permanent total disability

t

• '

-3or death benefits during such period, as well
as those newly awarded compensation during such
period.
33 U.S.C. (Supp. V) 909(b):
If the inJ· ury causes
death . .~ • the
compensation
?~
~~~~~--be kno~ as a ueath benef it and shall be payable
1n the amount and to or for the benefit of the
persons following: . . .
(b) If there be a widow or widower and no
child of the deceased, to such widow or widower
50 per centum of the average wages of the deceased,
during widowhood, or dependent widowerhood, with
two years' compensation in one sum upon remarriage;
and if there be a surviving child or children of the
deceased, the additional amount of 16 2/3 per centum
of such wages for each child; in the case of the
death or remarriage of such widow or widower, [etc.]
• . • Provided, That the total amount payable shall
in no case exceed 66 2/3 per centum of such wages.
~h~ll

(e) :

In computing death benefits the average v7eekly
wages of the deceased shall be considered to have been
not less than the applicable national average we ekly
wage as prescribed in section 6(b) but the total
weekly benefits shall not exceed the average weekly
wages of the deceased.
33 U.S.C. (Supp. V) 910(f):
Effective October 1 of each year, the compensation
or death benefits payable for permanent total disability
or death arising out of injuries sustained after the
date of enactment of this subsection shall be increased
by a percentage equal to the percentage (if any)_ by
which the applicable national weekly wage for the
period beginning on such Octob e r 1, as determined under
section 906(b) of this title, exceeds the applicable
national average \veekly --wage, as so de termine d, for
the period beginning with the preceding October 1.
GEO Control paid Mrs. Rasmussen and her son according to
.

'I:·

the maximum levels set in 33

u.s.c.

§

..

906 (b)(l) for ·d:l;ability

-4but the Rasmussens contended that they should be paid according
to 33 U.S.C. § 909(b) for death benefits.

The administrative

law judge at the Benefits Review Board, Department of Labor,
agreed with the Rasmussens, and the Board affirmed his decision.
Appeal was taken to CA 9 by the Director of the Office of
Workmen's Compensation Programs, U.S. Department of Labor, and
by GEO Control.
3. Opinion below (no dissents).
Review Board.

CA 9 affirmed the Benefits

The dispute centers around confusing cross-

references in the above

uoted sections.

906(b)(l) describes

maximum levels of compensation for disability.

But 906(d)

refers to"determinations under this subsection . . . for
permanent total disability or death benefits .
added).

." (emphasis

Hence, the maximum in 906(b)(l) seems to apply to

death benefits as well.

However, 909(b) explicitly provides

the scale for death benefits, and it is higher than the scale
for disability

if, as in this case, the decedent's earnings

were significarutly above the national average.

906(b)(l) sets

maxima in terms of the national average; 909(b) sets maxima in
terms of the actual wages that had been received, and 909(e)
Q.Lo

Jt fr...'

puts a floor on that e~
the national average,
;,
The problem is which lead to follow.

CA 9 observed that

before the 1972 amendments, the maximum payments had been the same
whether the cause were death or disability.

The court then traced

the legislative history, noting particularly the frequent recognitio r

-5of the fact that maximum levels of death compensation were
to be removed.

A good example is set out in footnote 7, p. lOA,

where the section-by-section description of the amendment
comments thaothe dollar minimum and maximum levels

under

the old law were being removed, and a new minimum imposed.
The difficulty with this view is that 906(d) then has
very little meaning when it refers to death benefits.

CA 9

held that it would still make sense to interpret the word
"determinations" to refer to the minimum levels, which, according
to 906(b)(3), would be set in terms of the national average
wage.
4. Contentions.

The Solicitor General, representing

the Director of the Office of Workers' Compensation Programs,
Department of Labor, begins his brief by assuring the Court
that the Director's standing to challenge the Board's opinion
could be fully defended, if the Court grants cert. or requests
a supplemental memorandum.
On the merits, the SG points out a direct conflict between
CA 9 and CADC and CA3.

This

i~

a genuine conflict.

In

Director v. O'Keefe, 545 F.2d 337 (1976) (CA 3) and
Director v. Boughman, 545 F.2d 210 (19760 (CADC), the respective
courts overruled the 3oard's position, explicitly
this case.

~eferring

to

And the CA 9 opinion in this case explicitly refers

to the CADC case, though it does not explicitly observe a conflict .

.

'

-6-

The SG's argument relies on 906(d), which does · refer
to the calculation of death benefits as made in that subsection.
If 906(d) were interpreted merely to be a reference to the
national average wage, to be used in calculating the minimum
amount of benefits, then there would have been no need for
910(f), which speaks in very direct terms about adjusting and
calculating the national average.

The SG further contends that

it would have been irrational for the Congress to favor the
relatives of deceased workers rather than the worker himself
while he is disabled.

Although the two groups are not in direct

conflict, it is true that CA9's interpretation will lead to
an increase in benefits upon the death of a disabled worker.
The SG urges that cert. be granted to resolve the conflict

l

between CA 9 and CA 3, CADC.

There are

~40

cases still

pending where compensation is in doubt, this is because the provisio r
of 906(b)(l) stipulate increased levels of -compensation in the
later years, so that the disparity has mooted out.

The petitioner

GAO mirrors the SG's arguments, but provides the useful statistic

1 that

there are 770,000 employees potentially covered by this Act.
The respondent does not discuss the conflict

circuits.

a~ong

the

But it urges that the issue is of no general importance,

drawing on the statistics provided by petitioner that only 40
out of 770,000 cases are involved, and there is no likelihood of
any future cases arising in view of the increasing steps in
906(b)(l).

-7-

5. Discussion.

There is an undeniable conflict over this

question of statutory inter retation.

Under CA9's view,

906(d) must be given a meaning that is strained, and that
is superfluous in light of 910 (f).

Under CA3 and CADC's

view, 909(b) is subordinated to the maximum levels set in
906(b)(l), which, in its terms, applies only to disability
benefits.
Since these benefits run for as long as the survivors
are alive and eligible (for children, under a certain age;
for spouses, diminished levels after re-marriage), it is
certain that some beneficiaries will receive more than their
equally -situated fellow beneficiaries when the only difference
is the federal judicial circuit in which they are located.
The act could generate raore

cas~s

in the admittedly unlikely

event of a national wage deflation, so that the higher percentages
in 906(b)(l), when multiplied by the national average, still
produce a lower amount thaLl 909 (b), which is geared to the wage
actually paid to the worker during his lifetime.

If the present

economy's wages are ever to be viewed as excessively high (as
the 1920 wage levels might have been viewed in the 1930's), then
the anomaly could arise again.

---

On the merits, I confess to an almost equally balanced
mind.

CA 9 strikes me as slightly more persuasive since the

-section directly dealing with death benefits ought to control

over a section in its terms dealing with compensation for disabilit y

-8-

and only made applicable to the case of death benefits by
the operation of another provision, several subseqtions away.
Both views necessitate concluding that some part of· the Act
is superfluous.
My recommendation is to grant in No.77-1491, where
petitioner's standing is beyond question, and to request
the Solicitor to submit the memo he suggested concerning
the standing of the Director of the Office of Workers'
Comp~nsation

Programs to petition the Court in this case.

5/30/78
There is a response.

Campbell

Opinion in petition
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c=~~ :!.,:,;:e~~8/1" 7~)
~.!!r/0Acf.

The issue in this case is whether the Longshoremen's
and Harbor Worker's Compensation Act, as amended (the Act),
imposes the same maximum limitation on death benefits as it
imposes on disability benefits.

In the present case, the CA 9

------~~---~----------held
that the Act does not impose the same limitation.
Director

v~

In

O'Keefe, 545 F.2d 337 (3d Cir. 1976), and Director

2.

v~

Boughman, 545 F.2d 210

(D.C.Cir. 1976), the courts reached

(~~)

the opposite conclusion.

Several of the Briefs reproduce the relevant statutory
provisions.

5~

The most helpful is that of petr Geo Control, at

~

pp. 3-7, which juxtaposes the provisions of the Act before an d

~EO'S"

~

after the 1972 amendments.
1.

The Language of the Statute
)I

Section 9(e) of the Act establishes limits on death

,,

benefits under the Act.

Before 1972, §9(e) established both a

maximum and minimum limit.
benefits was $70

The maximum limit on weekly

(2/3 x $105; see§ 9(d)), the minimum limit

$18 (2/3 x $27) or actual weekly wage, whichever was lower.
The amended §9(e) clearly provides for a minimum limit equal to
two-thirds of the "applicable national average weekly wage," or
to actual average weekly wage of the decedent, whichever is
less.

The amended version of § 9(e) does not contain any

maximum limit on death benefits.

~~

In contrast, §§6(b)(1) & (2)

-----------------------------

~

~
~~.~

contain provisions setting both maximum and minimum limits onA' _

,,

-~

lldisability compensation in terms of the national average weekly
wage.

The petrs entire effort in this case is directed to~ ~-~

5~

repairing the silence of amended §9(e) on this point.
The efforts of petrs based on language in other
sections of the Act are ingenious but unconvincing.

~~

~~
They argue

that §6(d) links death benefits and disability benefits, and

'7(_<)

~

~

~.

shows that the limitations of §6(b) on maximum disability ~

~-

.

'

3.

benefits should be read into §9(e) to limit death benefits.

To

reach this result, the petrs argue that the "determinations"
referred to in §6(d) are the calculations of maximum limits
under § 6 (b) ( 1 ) •

------------..

Section 6(b)(1 ), however, by its terms applies only to
"compensation for disability" and does not mention death
benefits.

-----.

Further, the term "determinations" in §6(d) is read

most reasonably as referring to the requirement of §6(b)(3)
that "the Secretary shall determine" periodically the national
average weekly wage.

On this reading, and by mentioning both

disability and death benefits, section 6(d) applies the latest
determination of national average weekly wage to the
calculation of §6(b) and §9(e) limitations applicable to those
whose eligibility commenced in some preceding period.

The

effect is to keep the limits for all current beneficiaries
moving with the national average weekly wage, rather than
leaving beneficiaries stuck forever with the limits in effect
in the year in which they first became eligible.

On this

reading, nothing in §6(d) alters the fact that §9(e) makes the
national average weekly wage relevant only to calculate the
minimum weekly death benefit.
Petrs argue that if one adopts the view of §6(d) just
stated, then the reference to "survivors" in that section is
superfluous in view of §10(f).

Section 10(f) provides:

"(f)
Effective October 1 of each year,
the compensation or death benefits

4.

payable for permanent total disability
or death arising out of injuries
sustained after October 27, 1972, shall
be increased by a percentage equal to
the percentage (if any) by which the
applicable national weekly wage for the
period beginning on such October 1, as
determined under section 6(b), exceeds
the applicable national average weekly
wage, as so determined, for the period
beginning with the preceding October
1• "
The petrs argue that since §10(f) already provides for the
annual upward adjustment of benefits in line with the latest
calculation of the national average weekly wage, §6(d) must
have some other purpose than simply adjusting the §9(e) limit
on minimum benefits.

They urge that §6(d), in view of §10(f),

makes sense only if there are also maximum limits on death
benefits.

The reasoning supporting this point can be

illustrated by the following examples.
Section 6(d) applies the latest determination of
national average weekly wage to the calculation of the relevant
limitations under §9(e) and §6(b).

But consider a beneficiary

(either a permanently disabled worker or the survivor of a
deceased worker) who, when first eligible, qualifies for
benefits somewhat above the minimum allowed by either §9(e) or
§6(b).

Under §6(d), considered alone, his benefits would

remain constant as the national average weekly wage increased,
until the minimum limitation finally caught up with his
original level of benefits and began to push it upwards.
Section 10(f) avoids this result by increasing all death

5.

benefits or compensation for permanent total disability each
year by a percentage equal to the increase that year in the
national average weekly wage.

The recipient remains each year

in the same position relative to the §6(b) and §9(e) limits.
Now consider the same recipient of benefits under
§10(f) alone.

His benefits would increase each year as the

national average weekly wage increased, until the amount of
benefits bumped up against the maximum limit applicable at the
time that he was awarded benefits.

Section 6(d) avoids that

result by applying each year's determination of the average
wage to the limits applicable

to~

recipients, not just to

those who are awarded compensation beginning in that period.
But if §9(e) imposes no maximum limit on death benefits, then
§10(f) alone would take care indefinitely of annual upward
adjustments in survivors' benefits.

There would be no uppoer

limit for death benefits to "bump up against," and therefore no
reason to refer to "survivors" in §6(d).
The petrs have identified an anomaly in the statute,
but only one involving a superfluity and not an inconsistency.

'--------~-------------------------------------------------~d
The
anomaly may be eliminated by construing §6(d) to impose the
maximum benefit limits of §6(b) (1) on §9(e).

As I see it, the

question is whether to respond to the anomaly by tolerating it,
or by ignoring the plain language of§§ 6(b)(1) and 9(e), which
applies a mizimum limit only to disability compensation.

I

would stay with the plain language, especially in view of the

6.

legislative history.
2.

The ·Legislative ·History
I will review only the principle arguments of the

parties, and indicate why I think resps have the better of the
case on this ground as well as on the statutory language.
In 1972, two bills were introduced to amend the Act.
Under one bill, co-sponsored by Senator Eagleton, the Chairman
of the committee handling the matter, maximum limits on death
and disability compensation were eliminated.

Under the other

bill, the fixed dollar limits were increased substantially.
The SG notes that both bills treated death and disability
benefits the same way, and reasons that the resulting
compromise (limits, but linked to a national wage average that
takes inflation into account) must have retained that feature.
Accordingly, he concludes, if maximum disability benefits are
set by §6(b), then the same maximum limits must be applicable
to death benefits under §9(e).

This is a non sequitur; it

depends upon the unsupported and unsupportable assumption that
any compromise necessarily retains the symmetry that the SG
perceives in the original bills.
The SG points out that in the Report of the National
cpmmission · on · state · workm~n'§ · cgmpensat!on ; Laws · (commissign

Report), the Commission accepted the need for maximum limits on
death benefits.

He also notes that the Commission Report

appears to have been influential in shaping several provisions

7.

of the amendments to the Act, and that the Senate Report on the
bill as reported said that "the provisions of tis bill are
fully consistent with the recommendations of the [Commission)."
This comment in the Senate Report, however, is contained in the
final paragraph of the summary of the report.

If one turns, to

the portions of the report dealing with §9(e), one gets a more
just estimation of the committee's actual view of that section.
In the general discussion of the major provisions of
the Act, with reference to "Survivor Benefits" payable under §§
8 and 9 of the Act, the Senate Report noted that such benefits
are "subject to a maximum of 66 2/3 percent of the average
weekly wages" of the decedent.

In the same passage, the Report

commented that "[a) minimum death benefit tied to the
applicable national average weekly wage but not to exceed the
employee's average weekly wage is also provided."

There is no

mention of a maximum limit on death benefits in§ 9(e), other
than the provision for a maximum minimum--that is, the benefits
cannot exceed actual wages, even if that figure is less than
two-thirds of the national average.
Later in the Report, in the section-by-section
analysis, the Report contains the following comment on §9(e):
"Section 10(d) amends section 9(e) to provide that in computing
death benefits the employee's average weekly wage shall be
considered as not less than the national average weekly wage.
However, maximum weekly death benefits could not be more than

8.

the employee's average weekly wages."

Again, there is no

indication that the limitations on disability benefits
established in §6(b) are to be read into §9(e).
In a subsequent portion of the Report, the change in
§9(e) was indicated by bracketing language to be deleted and

}fl

v\

italicizing language to be added:
"(e)
In computing death benefits the
average weekly wages of the deceased
shall be considered to have been not
[more than $105 nor] less than [$27]
the applicable national · average · weekl
wage · as prescr1 e 1n · sect1on ·
ut
the total weekly [compensation]
benefits shall not exceed the average
weekly wages of the deceased."
The clear indication is that the maximum limitation was
eliminated from §9(e) by the amendments of 1972.
The House Report on the bill amending the Act was even
more explicit about the change made in §9(e).

"[The bill]

amends section 9(e) of the Act, eliminating the dollar minimum
and maximum set out under present law for the average weekly
wages of the deceased to be used in computing death benefits.
The minimum substituted by this amendment is the applicable
national average weekly wage as prescribed in section 6(b) of
the Act, except that the total weekly benefits may not exceed
the actual average weekly wages of the deceased."
The House Report marked the changes in §9(e) as
follows:
"(e)
In computing death benefits the
average weekly wages of the deceased

9.

shall be considered to have been not
[more than $105 nor less than $27 but
the total weekly compensation shall not
exceed the weekly wages of the
deceased] less · than · the · applicable
national average weekly wage · as
prescribed · in · section · G(b) · but · the
total weekly 9enefits shall no€ exceed
the · average · weekly · wages · of the
decease~~"

'

Against all of these indications that the maximum
limit on death benefits was eliminated from §9(e) by the 1972
amendments, the petrs find support in a sinqle sentence of the
summary discussion of "Maximum and minimum benefit amounts."
The sentence seems to indicate that increases in death
benefits, like disability compensation, are subject to the
phase-in schedule of §6(b).

"To the extent that employees

receiving compensation for total permanent disability or
survivors receiving death benefits receive less than the
compensation they would receive if there were no phase-in,
their compensation is to be increased as the ceiling moves to
200 percent."
the

~port

I note that in the subsequent analysis of §6(b),

limits its effect to "compensation for disability."

The remainder of the petrs' legislative history

-------------------------------------------(1) Congress

arguments fall into several categories:

would not

~-------------------------~

have removed maximum limits on death benefits without more
extensive discussion in the committee Reports;

(2) Congress

would not have removed the maximum limit on death benefits
without doing the same for disability compensation;

(3)

Congress would not have removed the maximum limit on death

10 •

benefits because it is a bad idea to do so; and (4) Congress
would not have eliminated the maximum limit on death benefits
because the proposal to set a maximum limit related to national
average wage, when made by a witness at the committee's
hearings on the bill, was suggested for both death and
disability benefits; since Congress adopted the suggestion for
disability benefits, it must have done so for death benefits.
None of these arguments is convincing in the face of the
language of the statute and the committee Reports on the
amendments.
3.

Decisions of the ·cA · 3 and CA DC
In

~irector · v.

Boughman, 545 F.2d 210 (D.C.Cir. 1976),

the CA agreed with the position taken by petrs in the present
case.

To the arguments already reviewed, the CA added only

one:
"Foremost among our reasons for
reaching this conclusion is the
commonsense conviction that Congress
did not intend to provide, without ever
so stating and in sharp
contradistinction to every previous
version of the Act, that a totally
disabled employee, in need of
continuing care, should be compensated
less generously than the family of an
employee who dies.
It is hardly within
the policy of this Act to place a
premium on death."
~-

at 213.

The Act greatly liberalized the compensation

paid to disabled workers under §6(b).

That §9(e) appears to

have gone even further in liberalizing the benefits paid to

11•

survivors of deceased workers does not seem to me to be a good
reason for concluding that §9(e) "really" was meant to go only
as far as §6(b).
In Director v. O'Keefe, 545 F.2d 337 (3d Cir. 1976), the
CA also agreed with the position taken by the petrs here.

The

CA 3 relied principally upon the anomaly introduced by the
reference to "survivors" in §6(d).

summa~y

The petrs have two arquable bases for their position:
(1) the anomalous reference to "survivors" in §6(d); and (2)
the sentence from the Senate Report, quoted at p. 9 supra.

The

anomaly is real, at least as I have read the statutory system.
The sentence from the legislative report does appear to
contemplate the application of §6(b) (1) limitations to
survivors' benefits under§ 9(e).
The language of the statute, however, seems to me to
be clear enough.

Section 6(b) (1) is limited explicitly to

disability compensation.

Section 9(e), applicable to death

benefits, contains only a minimum limit.

The Senate and House

Reports indicate that the maximum limit on death benefits was
eliminated by the 1972 amendments.
CA 9 in this case.

I recommend affirming the
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lR, 1979

No. 14-1465 Director v. Rasmussen

Dear Bill:
Please show at the end of the next draft of your
opinion that I took no part in the decision of this case.
Sincerely,

Mr . Justice Rehnquist
lfp/ss
cc:

The Conference
I did not participate in decision because I
attended a funeral in New York on Nov. 28 when
this case was argued.

L.F.P., Jr.

-

QJl!Url d t!rt 'Jllnittb ;§taUs
~MJrhtghm. IIJ. QJ. 20~'1-$

.;§uprtm.t

CHAMBERS O F

JUSTICE POTTER STEWART

Re:

January 18, 19 79

No. 77-1465 & 77-1491 - Director, Workers'
Compensation Programs v. Rasmussen

Dear Bill:
I am glad to join your opinion for the
Court.
Sincerely yours,

Mr. Justice Rehnquist
Copies to the Conference

/

i'ltJlr.tUU QiltUrl o-f f4.t ~b' ,.Shd.t#
~agJrin:ghtn. ~.

<4- 2llp'!'

CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS

I
January 18, 1979

Re:

77-1465; 1491 - Director v. Rasmussen

Dear Bill:
Please join me.
Respectfully,
\

_,

I

-"· t·

Mr. Justice Rehnquist
Copies to the Conference
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<!fcnrl

~u.prttttt
ttf ffrt ~~ ~taf.tg
~Mfrin:gtcn. ~.<!f. zo~~~

v

CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE

w .. .

January 19, 1979

J . BRENNAN, JR.

REc Nos. 77-1465 & 77-1491 Director, Office of
Workers' Compensation Programs and GEO Control
v. Rasmussen, et al.
Dear Bi 11:
I agree.
Sincerely,

/fiJ
Mr. Justice Rehnquist cc: The Conference - -

-

l

~J

~upuntt

<!fllltrl of tqt ~tb ~~tg

,rMlfingtott. ~. elf.
CHAMBERS Of'

January 19, 1979

.JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE

Re:

211~'!~

Nos. 77-1465 & 77-1491: Director,
Office of Workers' Compensation
Programs, US Department of Labor
v. Rasmussen; and Geo Control, Inc.,
and New Hampshire Insurance Co.
v. Rasmussen

Dear Bill,
I agree.
Sincerely yours,

Mr. Justice Rehnquist
Copies to the Conference

~u:prtntt

cqcurl of tJrt 'J!ittittb- ~taf.tg

2liag I:p:ttg1cn:. tB . <q.

2.0gtJ!.,;l '

CHAMBERS OF

January 22, 1979

JU S TICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN

.

\

J

•
Re:

No. 77-14 6 5 - Director v. R a smu sse n
No. 77-1491 - Geo. Control, Inc. v. Rasmussen

Dear Bill:
Please join m e.
Sincerely,

Mr. Ju s tic e R e h n q u ist
c c:

The C onferenc e

.:§u:vrrntt <!fcurl cf tfrt ~b .:§ta.t.u
'maslyington, gl. <!f. 2!JgiJl.;t
CHAMBERS OF"

JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL

February 1, 1979

Re:

77-1465 - Director v. Rasmussen and
77-1491 - Geo Control v. Rasmussen

Dear Bill:
Please join me.
Sincerely,

T.M.

Mr. Justice Rehnquist
cc:

The Conference
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CHAMBERS OF

February 1, 1979

THE CHIEF .JUSTICE

Re:

/

(77-1465 - Director v. Rasmussen
(

(77-1491 - Geo Control v. Rasmussen

Dear Bill:
I join.

Mr. Justice Rehnquist
Copies to the Conference
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